Chakraborty and Banerjee have introduced a rough consequence logic based on the modal logic S5. This paper shows that rough consequence logics, with many of the same properties, can be based on modal logics as weak as K, with a simpler formulation than that of Chakraborty and Banerjee. Also provided are decision procedures for the rough consequence logics and equivalences and independence relations between various systems S and the rough consequence logics, based on them. It also shows that each logic, based on such an S, is theorem equivalent, but not necessarily equivalent, to the modal logic M-S. The paper also shows that rough consequence logic, which was designed to handle rough equality, is somewhat limited for that purpose.
Introduction
If α and β are wffs, α ≈ β (α is roughly equal to β) is defined by:
where L and M are the necessity and possibility operators.
In [5] Chakraborty and Banerjee proposed a rough consequence logic, based on S5, with two restricted modus ponens rules, designed to handle rough equality. In this paper we show that one of these rules is superfluous and that many of the interesting properties of rough consequence logic can be derived when modal logics weaker than S5 are used as a base logic.
We will consider rough consequence logics based on the simple modal logic K and stronger logics such as the Deontic logic D, the Feys-von Wright logic T, the Sobocinski logics S4 n (with S4 = S4 1 ) and S5 n (with S5 = S5 1 ) and the logics M n -S4 n , M n -S5 n and T * n of B laszczuk and Dziobiak [3] . M-S5 is also, by a mapping of Kotas [10] , equivalent to Jaśkowski's discussive logic D2, ([8] and [9] ).
For each such system S we give a simple decision procedure for Γ | ∼ S α (α is provable from Γ in the rough consequence logic based on S) in terms of a decision procedure (if any) for S, we show how each modal logic is related to its corresponding rough consequence logic and show that Γ | ∼ S α implies but is not generally implied by Γ M−S α. Finally we look at the properties of rough equality in the various modal and rough consequence logics.
K and Stronger Modal Logics
Each of the systems we consider includes the axioms of classical propositional logic and has the operators L and M where M α =∼ L(∼ α).
K has the usual modus ponens and substitution rules as well as the Rule of Necessitation:
and one extra axiom:
Below we will use the Rule of Monotonicity, which holds in K:
and the K-theorem (K7 of Hughes and Cresswell [7] ):
The Deontic Logic D has an extra axiom:
The logic T is K with the extra axiom:
and includes as theorems D and:
The Sobocinski logics S4 n have the additional axiom:
and the systems S5 n , due to B laszczuk and Dziobiak [3] , have, in addition to the postulates of S4 n :
Note that S4 1 = S4 and S5 1 = S5. For each of the above systems S and each positive integer n, there is a further system
(Note that we will often treat a logical system as the set of its theorems.) Finally we include the systems T
B laszczuk and Dziobiak [3] showed, following the work of Kotas [10] in the case n=1 and earlier work of Furmanowski [6] and Perzanowski [11] , that the systems T * n with the properties given below can be axiomatised in this way (where ⊂ represents "is a proper subset of "):
n is indepenent of S4 n+k for positive integers k.
Rough Consequence |∼
A basis logic S is a modal logic such that K⊆ S ⊆S5. We will use S for provability in S and | ∼ S for provability in the rough consequence logic based on S, as well as for the name of the formal system. If the S is omitted in a definition or theorem, the logic is assumed to be any basis logic, but the same one throughout.
| ∼ S can be defined (as it was, with S = S5 in Chakraborty and Banerjee [5] and Banerjee and Chakraborty [2] ) by:
Note that R 1 is the notation of Banerjee [1] . The rule is called (DR) 1 in Banerjee and Chakraborty [2] and DR 2 in Chakraborty and Banerjee [5] . We now show that (RM P ) 2 is derivable from the other postulates, for all our rough consequence logics.
Theorem 1 (RM P ) 2 follows from R 1 and (i).
Proof. If β and
Lβ → Lδ then, by (N), Lβ and so Lδ. K1 then gives M (δ → γ) → M γ. This with Γ | ∼ δ → γ and R 1 gives Γ | ∼ γ.
This theorem was proved independently, for the S = S5 case, in Banerjee [1] . In [1] she cites an early draft of the present paper that contains this theorem.
A paper, Bunder, Banerjee and Chakraborty [4] , examines the relative strengths of rough consequence logics with various conditions other than M β → M γ in R 1 .
By R 1 and (M) we have:
By (S4) and R 1 we have:
and by T1,
The following interesting properties of | ∼, for the basis logic S5, are from [2] and [5] , we show that they also apply for rough consequence logics based on other basis logics.
Proof By (i).
Proof By induction on the derivation of Γ, α | ∼ β. Required are M β → M (α → β), which comes by (M), and M γ → M β ⇒ M (α → γ) → M (α → β) which comes using K1.
Proof ⇐ By Theorem 7. Note that this implies that, if D ⊆ S, the rough consequence logic based on S is theorem equivalent to the logic M-S.
Rules for other connectives
The following are easily provable from R 1 for all basis logics.
Theorem 9
Γ | ∼ α β Γ | ∼ α ∧ β α Γ | ∼ β Γ | ∼ α ∧ β Γ | ∼ α ∧ β Γ | ∼ α Γ | ∼ α ∧ β Γ | ∼ β Γ | ∼ ∼∼ α Γ | ∼ α Γ | ∼ α Γ | ∼ α ∨ β Γ | ∼ β Γ | ∼ α ∨ β Γ | ∼ α ∨ β α → γ β → γ Γ | ∼ γ α ∨ β Γ | ∼ α → γ β → γ Γ | ∼ γ α ∨ β α → γ Γ | ∼ β → γ Γ | ∼ γ Γ | ∼ α → β α →∼ β Γ | ∼ ∼ α α → β Γ | ∼ α →∼ β Γ ∼ α
Decision Procedures for | ∼ and Relations between |∼ S and S
The M β → M γ in R 1 , rather than β → γ (or | ∼ β → γ), indicates that some Γ | ∼ γ may be provable while Γ γ.
On the other hand, the lack of a Γ before the in R 1 suggests that there may be a provable Γ γ, for Γ = ∅, while Γ | ∼γ.
Such results can be derived, for D ⊆ S, from the following simple characterisation of provability in | ∼ in terms of that in . Theorem 10 leads directly to:
and to Theorem 12 which shows that the converse of Theorem 5 fails for T ⊆ S and the converses of Theorems 6, 7 and 11 fail for all basis logics. Theorem 12(ii) also shows the failure of modus ponens in | ∼ .
Proof The above unprovability results for | ∼ are verified (using Theorem 10) by the unprovability in S5 of M q, M p → M q, M (p → q) → M q, and M (p → M q) → M q. These and the unprovability results in S5, and so in any sublogic S, in (i) and (iii) are all easily confirmed by the decision procedure for S5 in Hughes and Cresswell [7] . By T, LM α → M α so by K1 and Theorem 7, we have | ∼ M α → α, which we need in (i).
Theorem 13, below, outlines the relations between the basis logics and their corresponding rough consequence logics. To prove some of these we need a definition and a lemma. Proof By Theorem 5 and the proof of Theorem 13(i).
Lemma 1 also allows a counterpart to Theorem 10 for K:
Theorem 15 Γ | ∼ K α if and only if K α or there is a β ∈ Γ such that β → α.
Proof Similar to that of Theorem 10, but using Lemma 1.
Theorems 10 and 15 reduce the decision procedure for any | ∼ S to that for S. The Weakening Theorem for | ∼ holds by an easy induction, Cut Elimination can also be proved for | ∼.
Proof If S=K and Γ, α | ∼ β we have, using Theorem 15, α → β or, for some γ in Γ 2 , γ → β. By (M) we have either M α → M β or, for that γ, M γ → M β. If D ⊆ S and Γ, α | ∼ β, by Theorem 10, we also have either M α → M β or, for such a If we extend the definition of M-S to natural deduction systems by:
we have:
Theorem 19 If D ⊆ S, M-S is stronger than or equivalent to | ∼ S .
Proof If Γ | ∼ S α, by Theorem 10, there are two cases:
Theorem 20 M-S5 n is strictly stronger than | ∼ S5n .
By Theorem 10, this result does not hold for | ∼ S5n . Hence by Theorem 19, M-S5 n is strictly stronger than | ∼ S5n .
The question as to whether, for weaker systems S, M-S is strictly stronger than | ∼ S remains open. 
